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ABSTRACT
A distinction has been drawn in fair machine learning research be-
tween ‘group’ and ‘individual’ fairness measures. Many technical
research papers assume that both are important, but conflicting,
and propose ways to minimise the trade-offs between these mea-
sures. This paper argues that this apparent conflict is based on a
misconception. It draws on theoretical discussions fromwithin the
fair machine learning research, and from political and legal philos-
ophy, to argue that individual and group fairness are not funda-
mentally in conflict. First, it outlines accounts of egalitarian fair-
ness which encompass plausible motivations for both group and
individual fairness, thereby suggesting that there need be no con-
flict in principle. Second, it considers the concept of individual jus-
tice, from legal philosophy and jurisprudence which seems similar
but actually contradicts the notion of individual fairness as pro-
posed in the fair machine learning literature. The conclusion is
that the apparent conflict between individual and group fairness
is more of an artefact of the blunt application of fairness measures,
rather than a matter of conflicting principles. In practice, this con-
flict may be resolved by a nuanced consideration of the sources of
‘unfairness’ in a particular deployment context, and the carefully
justified application of measures to mitigate it.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Research on ‘fair’ machine learning (hereafter: Fair-ML) has pro-
posed a variety of ways to assess and ensure the fairness of super-
vised models for prediction and classification. These are largely fo-
cused on the application of ML in decision-making contexts which
involve allocating more or less positive and negative outcomes to
people, on the basis of predictions based on a person’s features.
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Imagine the following decision-making scenario. An employer
must select candidates for interview from a large set of applica-
tions. They decide to use a machine learning model which uses
information contained in an application and returns a prediction
about whether a candidate would make a good employee. Those
whose applications have sufficiently positive predictions are in-
vited to interview.
The employer finds that themodel is more likely to give positive
predictions for one gender (e.g. men) than others (e.g. women and
non-binary people). So they decide to apply some Fair-ML tech-
nique to the model to prevent this. However, as a result of this
modification, a man applicant is not invited to an interview. The
applicant complains, pointing to examples of women who were in-
vited to interview despite having qualifications very similar to his.
Should the employer continue to interview the women candidates,
or adjust its model again to ensure that any ‘more qualified’ men
get interviews instead?
Dilemmas like this one have been raised within discussions of
Fair-ML to motivate a supposedly important distinction between
two competing kinds of fairness. On the one hand, group fairness
ensures some form of statistical parity (e.g. between positive out-
comes, or errors) for members of different protected groups (e.g.
gender or race) [18]. On the other hand, individual fairness en-
sures that peoplewho are ‘similar’ with respect to the classification
task receive similar outcomes. These measures appear to conflict
in cases where, as a result of trying to satisfy group fairness, pairs
of individuals who are otherwise similar but differ in a protected
characteristic are assigned different outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to critically assess the apparent con-
flict between these two kinds of fairness measure. While the debate
that follows is primarily theoretical, its implications are significant
both for researchers and practitioners:
• For Fair-ML researchers, the apparent conflict between in-
dividual and group measures continues to motivate new re-
search papers many years after it was initially formulated
(in [18]). While many such papers propose technical means
to reconcile the twomeasures, they generally lack sustained
theoretical discussion regarding the underlying principles
supposedly in conflict.
• For practitioners, as ML models continue to be applied in a
wide variety of applications in the public and private sector,
decision-makers will turn towards governance measures pro-
posed by the Fair-ML community. In particular, the intu-
itions which motivated the proposal of individual fairness
in the academic debate - namely, that ‘less qualified’ indi-
viduals may unfairly be given opportunities in order that
the model can acheive some statistical measure of group
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fairness - may lead some to object to particular implemen-
tations of group fairness in practice. It is therefore essen-
tial that organisations deploying such measures can provide
sound justifications for the selection of particular fairness
measures.
Such justifications will require careful consideration of the prin-
ciples behind, and relationship between, group and individual fair-
ness. The contention of this paper is that the supposed conflict be-
tween the measures does not arise at the level of principle; these
are not two fundamentally different and conflicting types of fair-
ness. Rather, the appearance of conflict between the two is an arte-
fact of the failure to fully articulate assumptions behind them, and
the reasons for applying them in a particular context.
1.1 Overview of argument and contributions
Section 2 introduces the notions of individual and group fairness as
they have been developed in the Fair-ML literature, and elucidates
their perceived merits and shortcomings, and explains why it has
generally been assumed that they are in tension with each other. It
also provides an overview of various recent proposals to minimise
the trade-offs between the two measures.
Section 3 aims to map the relationship between these fairness
measures and a range of concepts and theories from moral, politi-
cal, and legal philosophy that they might be plausibly thought to
correspond to. I argue that while there are differences in the way
individual and group fairness are applied in specific contexts, they
don’t necessarily correspond to distinct and conflicting principles.
I argue that, at this abstract level, individual and group fairness
are not only not in conflict, but are in fact just different ways of
reflecting the same set of moral and political concerns.
In section 4, I pursue a complementary line of argument, which
examines a possible underlying motivation for individual fairness,
namely: individualized or particularized justice. This is the idea
that people deserve to be treated as unique individuals, and as-
sessed on a case-by-case basis. Like individual fairness, this con-
cept is grounded in the treatment of individuals. However, on this
view, even supposedly individually-fair models can be seen as indi-
vidually unjust because they still generalise between people who
share the same features. In this sense, what passes for individual
fairness actually amounts to a special case of group fairness. So
again the apparent distinction disappears when considered at the
level of principle.
Section 5 aims to persuade the reader that in so far as fairness
measures can be applied in particular contexts, there are very few
such contexts in which what have been termed ‘individual’ and
‘group’ fairness measures would be simultaneously applicable and
conflicting. In so far as they may appear to conflict in a given cir-
cumstance, this will be down to unstated conflicting moral and em-
pirical assumptions regarding the purpose of the decision-making
procedure and the nature of the fairness concerns inherent in that
particular context. This section also connects this argument to a
similar one made in [22].
In the interests of promoting interdisciplinary dialogue, to sat-
isfy readers from both computer science and social science / hu-
manities, I avoid formal notation, in favour of prose descriptions
of technical definitions.
2 ‘INDIVIDUAL’ AND ‘GROUP’ FAIRNESS IN
FAIR-ML
This section introduces the notions of individual and group fair-
ness as they have been developed in the Fair-ML literature, and
elucidates their perceived merits and shortcomings, and why it has
generally been assumed that they are in tension with each other. It
also provides an overview of a variety of recent proposals to min-
imise the trade-offs between the two measures.
2.1 Initial formulations of group and
individual fairness
Research on bias, fairness and discrimination in socio-technical
systems has a long history which significantly predates specific
work on fairness in machine learning (see e.g. [23, 24]). However,
such work did not propose formalised quantitative measures of
fairness.1 The first examples of Fair-ML fairness definitions arose
in the field initially known as ‘discrimination-aware data mining’
in the mid 2000’s.
2.1.1 Group fairness measures. These early papers used fairness
measures based on statistical parity between protected groups (e.g.
gender, race) in each outcome class, and hence are classed as group
fairness measures [10, 39].
According to statistical parity, a classifier is fair if there are equal
proportions of each protected group in each outcomeclass. Awider
range of different group fairness measures (also known as ‘statis-
tical’ measures) have since been proposed. They are all based on
some measure of statistical parity between people who have dif-
ferent values for a set of protected attributes. Some look at the dis-
tribution of errors between groups, e.g. false negative and positive
rates [11]. Other group fairness measures focus on calibration: e.g.,
a model is fair if it is equally calibrated between members of dif-
ferent protected groups (where calibration measures how closely
the model’s estimation of the likelihood of something happening
corresponds to the actual frequency of the event happening) [35].
One problem that is often raised for group fairness measures is
that they are only suited to a limited number of coarse-grained,
prescribed protected groups. They may miss unfairness against
people as a result of their being at the intersection of multiple
kinds of discrimination [15], or groups which are not (yet) defined
in anti-discrimination law but may need protecting [49]. If group
measures are only applied to coarse-grained groups separately (e.g.
gender, race), they might permit unfairness for structured combi-
nations of those groups (e.g. black women), also known as fairness
gerrymandering [34]. Some proposals aim to solve this problem by
defining fairness across many different combinations of protected
characteristics. A challenge here is that testing on every possible
subgroup doesn’t scale well to the large number of possible com-
binations, and may lead to overfitting [25, 34]. While these works
are in part motivated by notions of individual fairness, since they
still deal with groups (albeit potentially very fine-grained intersec-
tional groups) they can still be seen as a form of group fairness
measure.
1Formalised definitions of fairness which foreshadow those in Fair-ML did appear
in areas other than ML, such as testing in education and hiring. See Hutchinson &
Mitchell 2019 [30].
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2.1.2 Individual fairness measures. The first recognisable version
of individual fairness as a kind of Fair-ML criteria was proposed
in [18]. The motivation for individual fairness in this paper was
the concern that simple statistical parity between protected groups
in each outcome class could be intuitively unfair at the individual
level. The authors present several examples in which ‘statistical
parity is maintained, but from the point of view of an individual,
the outcome is blatantly unfair’. They note that a classifier could
be fair if it just gives positive outcomes to candidates from cer-
tain protected groups at random, just to ‘make up the numbers’.
This would be unfair to those individuals who fail to get a pos-
itive outcome which they deserve because they are more ‘quali-
fied’ than the randomly selected members of the otherwise under-
represented group (these may include both members of the advan-
taged and the disadvantaged groups). This is also to the detriment
of the decision-maker who loses utility, in the sense that a fair clas-
sifier on this definition needn’t provide accurate predictions or clas-
sifications.
To avoid these problems, various papers have proposed an individual-
level fairness measure [18, 32, 36]. The intuition behind this mea-
sure is that people who are similar with respect to the task should
be given similar predictions or decisions. Individuals are defined
in terms of a distance metric which represents how similar they
are to each other with respect to the features related to the task
or context of decision making. Two individuals are alike if their
combinations of task-relevant attributes are ‘nearby’ each other in
the defined metric space. It is assumed that the distance metric is
somehow defined by the people who set the policy (e.g. college
admissions tutors), and possibly with broader societal agreement,
and that this can be applied to individuals (e.g. college applicants).
Individual fairness says that for any two individuals, if their dis-
tance in task-relevant similarity is sufficiently small, they should
receive the same outcome (as defined in [18]); or alternatively, that
‘less qualified individuals should not be favored over more quali-
fied individuals’ [32].
While a mapping of the task-relevant similarity between all indi-
viduals could potentially avoid the problems with statistical parity,
it is unclear how decision-makers are supposed to obtain it. This
is the major shortcoming associated with the initial formulation of
individual fairness, one acknowledged by the authors [18]. Even if
such a mapping could be obtained, if it is only defined over indi-
viduals in the training set, we also lack a way to generalise to new,
unseen, individuals.
This difficulty has arguably stymied the practical application
of individual fairness measures, despite their theoretical appeal.
However, some subsequent proposals aim to relax the need for a
policymaker to provide all distance mappings between individuals,
and instead provide methods to learn such a distance function. In
some cases, the distance function is learned directly from the data
(e.g. [36, 54]). In Zemel et al. 2013, the approach involves mapping
individuals to a set of clusters based on their features, and these
cluster-based ‘prototypes’ are used as a relaxed proxy for individ-
ual similarity [54]. In this way, new examples could be mapped
automatically without requiring a priori similarity metrics to be
defined by a policymaker. Similarly, Lahoti et al. 2019 propose a
technique based on clustering, which aims at minimising the dis-
tances between the non-protected attributes of pairs of individuals
receiving the same outcome [36]. In other cases, the distance func-
tion is learned from judgements elicited from a panel of ethical
experts in response to comparisons between pairs of candidates
[33].
Other approaches give up the attempt to determine a similarity
metric, and focus on the notion of individual merit [32]. A model is
fair on this view if the probability of an individual being predicted
to have a certain label corresponds to the true (but unknown) prob-
ability that they actually have (or will have) that label. For instance,
a CV scoring model which predicts a job applicant has a certain
chance of succeeding at interview should reflect the true proba-
bility the job applicant will actually succeed. The challenge for
this approach is that, since the true labels of new instances are
unknown, strong assumptions have to be made about the relation-
ship between the observable features and the unobservable ground
truth.
2.1.3 Reconciliation between individual and group measures. Sev-
eral proposals attempt to find an optimal balance between the two
kinds of measures. For instance, in their proposal for combining in-
dividual and group fairness, Zemel et al. build in statistical parity
constraints into the process of learning fair representations, such
that an individual’s chance of being represented as a particular pro-
totype does not depend on their membership in a protected group
[54]. While Lahoti et al’s explicit aim is to capture individual fair-
ness, they note that their approach indirectly improves group fair-
ness because it reduces information on protected attributes, and,
they argue, makes the multi-objective problem of satisfying utility,
group fairness and individual fairness more tractable [36].
However, despite attempts to partly reconcile these two mea-
sures, it appears that there are inherent trade-offs between them.
Unless the distribution of features and labels is the same across
different protected groups, the intuition behind individual fairness
will always appear to be violated in some way. According to pro-
ponents of individual fairness, we should remain concerned about
models which give different outcomes to people who are similar,
whether their similarity is defined according to some distance met-
ric, or in terms of the true probability of having a certain label.
Lahoti et al regret that individual fairness has been generally ne-
glected in favour of group fairness, because the former is ‘intuitive
and captures aspects that group fairness does not handle’ [36]. Con-
versely, for proponents of group fairness, individual fairness is li-
able to result in seemingly unjust disparities in outcomes between
protected groups.
3 IS THERE A GROUP / INDIVIDUAL
DISTINCTION IN PRINCIPLE?
This section aims to connect the justifications offered for individ-
ual and group fairness measures in the Fair-ML literature to a range
of concepts and theories frommoral, political, and legal philosophy
that they might correspond to. Based on this mapping exercise, I
argue that while individual and group fairness may appear to con-
flict in the Fair-ML literature, they don’t necessarily correspond to
distinct and conflicting philosophical or moral principles. I argue
that, at this abstract level, individual and group fairness are not
only non-conflicting, but are in fact different aspects of the same
consistent set of fundamental moral and political concerns.
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Before proceeding, it is worth acknowledging that it may seem
surprising that an appeal to philosophy could reduce, rather than
increase, the complexity and nuance of normative concepts for-
malised by computer scientists. From the perspective of computer
scientists and other technical researchers working on Fair-ML, it
may appear that philosophers, lawyers, and other humanities schol-
ars deal withmany different and conflicting notions of fairness that
have been the subject of intractable debate for millenia. Given this,
the variety of fairness measures proposed by Fair-ML researchers
may seem positively parsimonious. Similarly, critics of Fair-ML
from philosophical and other backgroundsmight reasonablyworry
that in technical researchers’ haste to formalise, the nuances and
differences betweenmoral concepts might be flattened into an arti-
ficially small cluster of homogeneous technical definitions of fair-
ness. As such, one might expect that social science and humanities
scholars are more likely to expand sub-types of fairness rather than
collapse them.
It may be true that there are fewer normative concepts dealt
with in Fair-ML, than dreamt of in philosophy. But in some cases,
philosophical and social science perspectives may illustrate that
concepts which are apparently conflicting at a technical level are
not reflective of a deeper normative conflict. This paper argues that
this is the case regarding the notions of individual and group fair-
ness as they have developed in the Fair-ML literature. That is, while
these measures are presented as representing two different kinds
of fairness, they can just as easily correspond to the same underly-
ing moral concept. Any conflicts between the two would therefore
be artefacts of the possibility that the same underlying concept can
be operationalised in different ways.
In this section I briefly outline two normswhichmight plausibly
be thought to lie behind these notions. In the interests of brevity,
the selection and presentation of these norms is necessarily partial,
and draws from a narrow literature. However, in searching for cor-
responding concepts in the literature, I take as my starting point
the partially articulated normative motivations mentioned in the
Fair-ML literature from which the individual / group distinction
arose. While these papers did not generally engage in sustained
consideration of corresponding and supposedly conflicting norms
behind individual / group fairness, they do provide brief and some-
times oblique references to normative concepts.2
3.1 Consistency
In Dwork et. al 2012 [18], individual fairness is motivated by refer-
ence to the notion that ‘similar cases should be treated alike’. This
is a position associated with Aristotle’s conception of justice as
consistency [44]. It is valuable desiderata of justice that decision-
makers can produce a single predictable and correct judgement in
each case; when presented with identical cases, judges ought usu-
ally to come to the same answer. For Dicey, this was to be acheived
by deterministic application of the rules [16]; for Dworkin, judges
have more flexibility in their interpretation of rules and principles,
but nonetheless ought to alight on a single judgement [19]. The
implication is that given two cases in which the features are iden-
tical, and assuming an identical legal system with the same set of
2 More recent work draws more explicit connections to political philosophy e.g. [6,
26, 27]
statutes, case law and institutional history, judges ought to come
to the same conclusion.3
From one perspective, consistency should not be considered a
problem forML-assisted decisionmaking. Supervisedmachine learn-
ing models are generally speaking deterministic in producing iden-
tical outputs in response to particular inputs (at least, until they are
replaced by new iterations trained on fresh data). So on one level,
both group-fair and individual-fair models satisfy consistency. How-
ever, Aristotle’s maxim bears a striking similarity to the initial for-
mulation of individual fairness in Dwork et al, in terms of ‘similar
individuals being treated similarly’. If we apply Aristotle’s maxim
to comparisons between pairs of people who have been classified
differently due to a group fairness constraint, despite having simi-
lar features, it may seem that some version of the consistency prin-
ciple has been broken. In this context, consistency appears to be the
norm to which individual fairness corresponds.
The problem with this formulation of consistency is that, in not
specifying the means of comparing likeness between cases, it tells
us very little and leaves everything to be debated. This has lead
some to criticise Aristotle’s notion of equality as being ‘empty’
[44, 52]. Two individuals from different protected groups can only
be counted as ‘similar’ if we omit their protected characteristics;
but what justifies this omission? Why focus on some similarities
and not others? What is the justification for designating certain
characteristics as protected in the first place? The mere principle
of consistency cannot answer these questions; both individual and
group fairness could therefore be seen as ‘inconsistent’ depending
onwhich features we exclude or include. However, these questions
are dealt with in accounts of egalitarian political justice, covered
in the next section.
3.2 Egalitarianism
Alongside the indirect references to Aristotle’s notion of ‘treat-
ing like cases alike’, a handful of early Fair-ML papers (inlcuding
[18]) refer to political philosophers such as John Rawls, who pro-
pound theories of egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is the notion that
people need to be treated in some senses equally, or that certain
things need to be distributed according to some egalitarian prin-
ciple [2, 13, 20, 42, 45, 51]. An overview of egalitarian theories of
justice and their relationship to Fair-ML is beyond the remit of this
paper (for which, see [6]). While egalitarians advocate for equality,
they usually do not mean that everyone should be allocated an
equal share of everything regardless of their choices and circum-
stances. Rather, they aim to ensure a ‘level playing field’ for every-
one (often referred to as ‘equality of opportunity’). A prominent
approach, known as luck egalitarianism, holds that inequalities be-
tween people are only just provided they are not the result of brute
luck [4, 29, 46]. If people find themselves worse off through no fault
of their own, luck egalitarianism would consider their plight to be
unjust. If on the other hand, people are worse off as the result of
free choices the consequences of which are reasonably foreseeable,
or if they take an informed risk which doesn’t pay off, this is not
an injustice on the luck egalitarian account.
3Not all of jurisprudence places such a high premium on consistency; there is a large
literature on the desirability of discretion, and scepticism about Dworkin’s faith in
there always being a right answer. See the section below on individual justice.
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Egalitarians may differ in their views about which attributes or
circumstances people can rightly be held responsible for. They may
disagree, for instance, about whether the distribution of natural
talents should be regarded as a matter of luck and therefore un-
just [43], or instead whether people should be permitted to reap
the rewards of their natural talents [42]. Some critics question the
notion of a ‘luck’/’choice’ distinction, pointing out that certain dis-
advantages may be the result of free and informed choices, but for
which the chooser should not be left significantly worse off as a
result, such as choosing to forgo a more lucrative career in order
to help others [2, 47]. Despite these differences, the basic impetus
remains the same; people should only suffer disadvantages, or en-
joy advantages, that result from certain kinds of choices they make,
and not circumstances they find themselves in through no fault of
their own.
When it comes to the allocation of jobs, welfare, loans, places
in higher education, or bail decisions, egalitarian theories could
provide a philosophical framework within which to evaluate the
justice of decisions. For instance, we might use a luck egalitarian
account to assess the extent to which decision outcomes can vary
depending on certain features. As proposed in recent work by Hei-
dari et. al [26], features can be separated into those for which indi-
viduals are not responsible, and those for which they are. (The au-
thors use the terms ‘circumstance’ and ‘effort’ to demarcate these,
but depending on the variant of egalitarianism adopted, different
terms may be appropriate.) For instance, to the extent that certain
attributes held by college applicants are the result of brute luck
(e.g. whether or not they were born to parents could afford to pay
for expensive test tuition), such attributes would not justify more
favourable outcomes in admissions decisions. Such a direct appli-
cation of philosophical accounts of justice to Fair-ML might not
always be possible; for instance, those cited above who reject lib-
eral egalitarian tenets like the choice / circumstance distinction
[14, 28, 53] might be sceptical about the possibility of ever finding
features which are untainted by oppressive structures.
However, to the extent that such egalitarian theories can mean-
ingfully be a guide to ‘fair’ feature selection, they would typically
classify the kinds of protected characteristics commonly cited in
Fair-ML - such as gender or race - as attributes which would not
justify unequal distributions. In other words, concerns about un-
fairness on these specific grounds are a subset of a broader set
of egalitarian concerns (albeit a highly significant, and perhaps
paradigmatic subset). In so far as egalitarianism seeks to equalise
the distribution of outcomes between such groups, it might seem
to be the natural corresponding normative principle that would
justify group fairness.
However, just as the principle of consistency can actually be
commensurate with group fairness (despite its natural affinity with
individual fairness), so egalitarian concerns can also be couched
in terms of individual fairness (despite their natural affinity with
group fairness). Consider that when specifying an individual fair-
ness metric, the policymaker will need to consider certain features
(e.g. exam scores) and ignore others (e.g. first language) when as-
signing distances between pairs of individuals. Those choices re-
flect normative assumptions which may well correspond to the
egalitarian principles above. This make sense if we see the no-
tion of ‘task-relevance’ as already incorporating normative aspects.
For instance, a policymaker operationalising the luck egalitarian
framework could base their determination of task-relevant simi-
larity on norms and causal assumptions which account for the at-
tributes for which individuals can be held responsible for. In some
cases, they might adjust the distance metric to account for features
which reflect circumstances outside the individual’s control which
would otherwise make them appear ‘less qualified’. For instance,
theymight determine that while personA has the same exam score
as person B, since A took the exam in their second language, A
may be more qualified for the task than B (because A’s exam score
suggests they must have higher overall competence, and/or have
applied greater effort, given their language barrier). Such an ap-
proach to individual fairness would incorporate the kinds of struc-
tural unfairness that egalitarians might be concerned about, while
still operating at the individual level.
The considerations above suggests that while theremay be natu-
ral affinities between the usual formulations of individual fairness
and consistency, and the usual motivations for group fairness and
egalitarianism, these are only surface deep. Consistency and egal-
itarianism themselves do not conflict at the level of principle. In
fact they can even be seen as mutually implied; in so far as luck
egalitarianism aims to remove luck from allocation, it implies con-
sistency. And in so far as the process of defining task-relevant simi-
larity can already be an exercise in normative judgement, it makes
sense to incorporate egalitarian concerns into it. It is therefore both
possible and indeed coherent to adopt consistency-respecting for-
mulations of group fairness, as well as egalitarian formulations of
individual fairness. The details of their implementation may vary,
but both approaches can reflect the same set of normative motiva-
tions.
4 INDIVIDUAL FAIRNESS VS INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE
Those with a strong commitment to the notion of individual fair-
ness as distinct from group fairness may find this attempt at rec-
onciling the two measures unsatisfying. They might appeal to the
idea that there is a fundamental normative difference between a
decision-making procedure which treats people differently on the
basis of group membership, and one which focuses on them as in-
dividuals.
What principle might lie behind such an appeal to focus on in-
dividuals, not groups? In this section, I consider a more fundamen-
tal notion that could plausibly be thought to motivate individual
fairness. This is what might be called ‘individual justice’; the idea
that individuals should be assessed on their own qualities, circum-
stances, and attributes, not on the basis of generalisations about
groups of which they happen to be a member. However, despite
the apparent connection, proponents of individual fairness will not
find solace in this notion, for reasons covered in the following sec-
tion. Individual fairness measures ultimately, like group fairness
measures, fail to treat people truly as individuals.
4.1 Aristotle’s other maxim
To understand this notion of individual justice, we can appeal to
another one of Aristotle’s maxims. In addition to saying that like
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cases should be treated alike, Aristotle described a different (and
possibly contrary) position (as quoted in [44]):
‘There are some things about which it is not possi-
ble to pronounce rightly in general terms ... the raw
material of human behaviour is of this kind’.
Legal philosopher Frederick Schauer calls this notion ‘individu-
alised’ or ‘particularised’ justice [44]; it holds that people need to
be assessed individually, rather than on the basis of rules derived
from consideration of similar cases who came before. In German
jurisprudence, it is known as Einzelfallgerechtigkeit (‘justice in the
particular case’) [9]. Similarly, U.S. jurors have argued that mak-
ing a decision about one individual on the basis of a generalisation
about similar people ‘is not consistent with respect based on the
unique personality each of us possesses’.4 A similar notion is de-
ployed in some philosophical accounts of discrimination, accord-
ing to which it is wrong because it fails to treat people as individ-
uals [5, 37, 38].
Arguments for the normative value of individualised assessment
are not the preserve of jurisprudence and philosophy. They of-
ten appear in calls for public administrators to exercise discretion
rather than routine application of rules [41], and also in many
contexts in which issues of fair treatment arise between private
actors (e.g. housing). In contexts in which public administration
and private decision-making are being automated or augmented
with algorithms, the need for occasional individualised consider-
ation is one of the reasons for keeping a human-in-the-loop, or
‘screen-level bureaucrat’ on hand [1, 8, 12, 48]. By scrutinising ad-
ditional information about the individual that the algorithm does
not consider, and considering alternative forms of reasoning re-
garding mitigating circumstances that an algorithm could not, the
‘human-in-the-loop’ may be able to serve the aim of individual jus-
tice.5
4.2 Individual justice and ML
The focus on individual cases within individual justice might ap-
pear to provide proponents of individual fairness with a new ar-
gument for favouring their approach over that of group fairness.
It suggests that any form of generalisation on the basis of group
membership is unfair. If we really care about being fair to individ-
uals, then we should look to individualized justice.
However, individually-fair models would also count as individu-
ally unjust on this account. In its algorithmic guise, individual fair-
ness still essentially equates an individual with their features (or,
perhaps, their position in the model-defined feature space). Once
a similarity metric has been defined (or whatever other individual
fairness approach chosen has been applied), features selected, and
an ML model trained and deployed, any individuals who share the
same features will get the same outcome. They are given a predic-
tion or classification on the basis that they are like those who came
before them who shared the same features. According to individ-
ual justice, this is unfair; individual cases must be assessed on their
4In Rice v. Cayetano , 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000). See also [3, 50] — I thank Renèe Jor-
gensen Bolinger for bringing these works to my attention via forthcoming work [31].
5For a sceptical appraisal of such claims, see [7].
Fair-ML concept Philosophical Corollary
Group Fairness Egalitarianism, Anti-Discrimination
Individual Fairness Consistency, Individual Justice*
Table 1: Putative relation between Fair-ML concepts and le-
gal / philosophical corollaries as intimated in existing Fair-
ML literature. However, as illustrated in Table 2, both fami-
lies of fairnessmeasure can equally be related to each of the
other philosophical corollaries. * Individual fairness only
superficially reflects individual justice - see section 4.2
own, disregarding any previous knowledge that may have been in-
ferred from previous similar cases, and potentially incorporating
new kinds of information and reasoning particular to the case.
This suggests that if we really care about individualized assess-
ment in a decision-making context, then we cannot treat it princi-
pally as a ‘decision problem’ in the sense that computer scientists
might think about decision problems; namely, as yes-or-no ques-
tions that can be provided in response to a delimited range of pos-
sible input values. While deeply impractical for anyone attempting
to replace human decision-making with algorithms, individual jus-
tice is a logical extension of the argument that generalisation based
on group membership is wrong. In so far as individual fairness is
at all viable as a kind of Fair-ML measure, it cannot be truly in-
dividualized, and is in fact akin to a kind of group generalisation,
where each group is defined in terms of the people who occupy a
particular point in the defined task-relevant metric space.
To recap the argument of this section: proponents of individ-
ual fairness might think that by drawing on the notion of indi-
vidual justice, they have a more fundamental argument in favour
of their own position and against group fairness. However, even
individually-fair models would still involve generalisation (albeit
more fine-grained) and therefore do not really preserve individual
justice.
5 DISSOLVING THE CONFLICT IN PRACTICE
The previous sections argued that there is no fundamental conflict
between two of the main principles that plausibly correspond to
individual and group fairness measures (namely, consistency and
egalitarianism), and furthermore, that neither individual nor group
fairness can respect the essence of a third principle (individual
justice), despite its surface similarity with the former. Having dis-
solved the group / individual conflict in theory, this section aims to
illustrate how it can be dissolved in practice, through two specific
hypothetical examples.
Those familiar with trying to implement Fair-ML techniques
may suspect that, despite the theoretical compatibility argued for
above, we would still face difficult normative conflicts between
these two types of fairness measures when applying them in prac-
tice. The examples presented below aim to show that such con-
flicts are not primarily the result of selecting individual or group
fairness measures. Instead, they are likely to be the result of un-
stated conflicting moral and empirical assumptions regarding the
decision-making context. Once these conflicting assumptions are
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resolved, the resulting fairness concerns can be reflected in either
individual or group measures of fairness — but there will usually
be no need to pit one measure against the other.
5.1 Example 1: College Admissions
Imagine the decision-making context of college admissions, where
admissions panels must decide which applicants to accept for a de-
gree programme.6 This is a context in which individual and group
fairness measures might be thought to be in conflict.
If a higher proportion of applicants from group B are accepted
than applicants from group A, the system might seem unfairly bi-
ased against group B (where A and B are different values of a pro-
tected characteristic). On the other hand, if two applicants who
have similar SAT scores, extra-curricular activities, and interview
scores are given different outcomes, the system may seem unfair
in a different way. An unsuccessful applicant from group B who
has equal or better scores than some successful members of group
A might feel they have been dealt an unfair outcome (for reasons
expressed in Aristotle’s ‘like cases’ maxim).
A typical Fair-ML approach might be for the college admissions
panel to address the first set of concerns through a group fairness
metric, and the latter through an individual fairness metric. They
would then be faced with a trade off between these two, to be dealt
with by picking one or the other, or attempting to strike a balance
by treating the learning process as a multi-objective optimisation
problem. However, the arguments presented above suggest that
the two sets of concerns may actually have a common normative
source; and that any conflict between the measures is more likely
to be the result of a failure to clarify what kinds of injustice are
assumed to exist and are being addressed.
The first task is to decide what objectives they have in award-
ing places to applicants. One criteria might be giving places to ap-
plicants most likely to succeed in their college studies. This is a
laudable aim, but in most cases it is not and should not be the only
aim. They might also aim (echoing the luck egalitarian perspec-
tive), to avoid making decisions which would lead people to suffer
disadvantages arising from circumstances outside of their control.
Some applicants might appear more or less likely to succeed at
college due to factors like whether or not they had parents who
could pay for expensive test preparation. They may also actually
be more or less likely to succeed after being admitted due to fac-
tors outside their control, such as systemic racism or sexism in the
higher education institution. In such cases, it would be unjust to
distribute college places on the basis of features which predict suc-
cess at college, in so far as such features and such success are in
part a function of circumstances that should be excluded (as would
be suggested by the egalitarian perspective).
If the college admissions panel can agree upon a set of assump-
tions about what factors lie outside an applicant’s control, and the
probable influence of those factors on the distribution of features
in college applications, they might then be in a position to formu-
late some kind of fairness measure to apply to their system. Of
6The use of this example should not be taken to condone the use of algorithmic
decision-making to make such important decisions; it is for illustrative purposes only,
as in other works, e.g. [22]. We also note that, unfortunately, such systems are already
in use [21].
course, this is not an easy task, and the legitimacy of any assump-
tions made could (rightly) be challenged. However, assuming for
the sake of argument that the college has a legitimate and account-
able process by which they can reach an agreeable set of assump-
tions, the first question they should ask is not: ‘should they use
individual or group fairness?’. Rather, it is: ‘what kinds of injus-
tice do we believe may be in operation in this context that may be
reflected in and perpetuated by the model being used?’ Two ends
of the spectrum of answers to this question are a) assuming the
disparities are mostly due to structural discrimination, and b) as-
suming they are mostly due to individual choice, not circumstance.
Let us consider each in turn and the consequences for the choice
of fairness measure.
Assuming SAT and graduation rate disparities are due to struc-
tural discrimination
Imagine they conclude that applicants from group A on average
face greater adversity in society in general, as well as more specif-
ically in the context of college admissions and post-admission per-
formance. In order for applicants from group A to obtain the same
SAT scores as applicants from group B, they have to make greater
sacrifices and apply more effort. When admitted, they face more
barriers to success than group B, which affects their chances of
graduation. While they cannot be sure exactly how great the ef-
fect these forms of adversity is, the college admissions panel comes
to the conclusion that, for the purposes of implementing Fair-ML,
the effect is largely responsible for any observed differences in SAT
scores and graduation rates between groups A and B.
Given this conclusion, they could equally choose a group fair-
ness or individual fairness measure. If we assume that differences
in SATs and graduation rates are largely responsible for the dis-
parate impact of the original ML model, then a statistical parity
measure might be appropriate. Similar assumptions could justify
other kinds of group fairness measures, such as equalised false pos-
itive / false negative rates.
But the same assumptions could equally motivate the adoption
of an individual fairness measure which factors in those forms of
discrimination. For instance, if they have agreed that the adver-
sity faced by applicants for group A accounts for an average of
100 fewer points on their SATs, they can factor this in when de-
termining if pairs of individuals from groups A and B are similar.
An applicant from the A-group with an SAT score of 1500 will be
considered to be similar to an applicant from the B-group with an
SAT of 1600.
Indeed, this idea is posited in the original formulation of indi-
vidual fairness [18], where the authors note that individual fair-
ness ‘will most likely only be society’s current best approximation
to the truth’. They ‘envision classification situations in which it is
desirable to “adjust” or otherwise “make up” a metric’, citing the
example of college admissions offices ‘adding a certain number of
points to SAT scores of students in disadvantaged groups’. Similar
adjustments could be made to other features used for prediction.
So just as with group-based statistical parity measures, the indi-
vidual fairness distance metric could represent a rough consensus
about how disadvantaged certain groups are in a given context. In
some contexts, it may be that the simplest and most workable as-
sumption is that the effects of disadvantage faced by a given group
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fully account for any negative disparities reflected in the data for
that group (therefore justifying a statistical parity measure).
Assuming SAT and graduation rate disparities are due to personal
choice
On the other hand, imagine instead that the college admissions
board comes to a rough consensus that the differences between
groups A and B are due to the personal choices of members of
each group and not due to circumstance outside their control. They
conclude that individuals from group B face no less adversity than
those from group A, and the differences between outcomes are ac-
counted for by other factors (perhaps members of group B just
spendmore time on their applications on average, and studyharder
after admission).
Again, given this assumption, the choice is not between individ-
ual or group fairness measures, but rather between a range of mea-
sureswhich reflect these assumptions, some ofwhich are classed as
‘individual’ and others which are classed as ‘group’. For instance,
they could choose an individual fairness measure which doesn’t
make adjustments to SAT scores on the basis of membership in
group A. Or they could choose a group fairness measure which ac-
cepts that differential base rates between A and B are not problem-
atic, and not attempt to correct for these. For instance, they could
choose ‘equal calibration’, according to which the model should
be equally well-calibrated on applicants from groups A and B [35].
Equal calibration allows for models which give disproportionately
positive / negative predictions between groups, so long as those
proportions are reflected in the real labels of groups A and B in
the test data set. In other words, it treats disparities in SATs or
graduation rates, and any corresponding disparities in predictions
by a model trained on them, as fair. On this approach (assuming
that higher SAT scores have a positivemonotonic relationshipwith
graduation rates), then an applicant from group B would likely not
(other things being equal) lose ‘their’ place to a ‘less-qualified’ ap-
plicant from group A. This therefore echoes the original motiva-
tion for (un-adjusted) individual fairness.
5.2 Example 2: Financial Lending
Imagine a decision-making scenario in which a bank uses an ML
model to determine which loan applications will be approved or
denied. Imagine the bank notices that historically, men have had a
higher probability of being given a positive label (indicating that
they repay their loan) than women.7
Assuming positive label disparities are due to historic discrimina-
tion
After consulting with a range of stakeholders and experts, the bank
identifies several likely reasons why women in the dataset have
historically been less likely to receive a positive label. These in-
clude factors like (for instance) clerks being more lenient with re-
payment deadlines for men, and women being more likely to be
7This section has been informed by analysis of the Statlog (German Credit Data) Data
Set [17]. Comparing the positive labels of women and men in this dataset shows a
statistical (dis)parity of -11%
single parents with unpredictable outgoings due to their depen-
dants. The bank comes to the conclusion that it would be unfair
for these factors to disadvantage future women applicants. On the
basis of the evidence it has been able to gather, it assumes that
the differences in outcomes between men and women, and the fea-
tures which predict them, can be accounted for by these unjust
structural disparities.
Given this assumption, should the bank use group or individ-
ual fairness measures to evaluate the fairness of its lending algo-
rithm? If it opts for group fairness, this could involve, for example,
re-weighting the historical data to edit feature values to increase
group fairness [41]. Alternatively, the bank could opt for individ-
ual fairness. This would involve creating a task-relevant similarity
metric and applying it to the data using one of the methods de-
scribed in the individual-fairness literature (e.g. [18, 33, 36]). Hav-
ing already concluded that the features that predict higher default
rates by women (namely, ‘late’ repayments and less predictable
outgoings) are features which are unjustly affected by gendered
social structures, the values of these features for women will need
to be adjusted accordingly when applying the individual fairness
metric (as with the SAT score adjustment example from [18], and
above).
While these individual and group approachesmay involve some-
what different processes, they are equally motivated by the same
set of empirical and moral assumptions - i.e. that the disparity in
default rates between men and women reflect unjust structures -
and both aim to produce a model which makes predictions which
ignore the effects of those social structures. Both approaches could
result in men objecting that they have lost a loan opportunity to
a ‘less qualified’ woman - so the supposed advantage of individual
fairness (that it avoids such individual scenarios) is lost once the
structural dimension is factored into an individual fairness mea-
sure.
Assuming positive label disparities are due to personal choices, not
circumstance
Alternatively, imagine (perhaps implausibly) that the research shows
no evidence that the differences between positive labels for men
and women in the historic data are the result of unjust social struc-
tures. In other words, the bank concludes that any differences are
the result of factors for which we would hold the individuals per-
sonally responsible. In this case, the bank could apply an individ-
ual fairness measure which does not attempt to adjust individual
features on the basis of gender. A man and woman with the same
repayment recordwould be regarded as similar, because there is no
evidence of (for instance) gender-unequal leniency of bank clerks.
But given these same assumptions, they could also apply group-
based fairness measures like equal calibration. As with the college
admissions example, equal calibration does not treat disparities in
outcomes (in this case, loan repayment) as evidence of unfairness
which themodel should avoid learning and reproducing (instead, it
only addresses disparities in calibration between genders). As such,
it is unlikely that an equally-calibrated model would (other things
being equal) give a more positive prediction to a woman than a
man if they both have equal repayment rates. As such, equal cali-
bration is a group-fair measure which preserves the same kind of
normative considerations that an un-adjusted individual fairness
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Normative/Empirical Assumption Individual Fairness Group Fairness
Disparities due to personal choices ‘Raw’ Similarity Metric Equal Calibration
Disparities due to unjust structures Group-adjusted Similarity Metric Statistical Parity
Table 2: Possible normative/empirical assumptions, and corresponding group/individual fairness measures.
would aim to protect in this scenario (and ignores the normative
considerations that motivate other group-fair measures like statis-
tical parity and individual-fair measures that incorporate adjust-
ments to features based on protected group membership).
5.3 The important difference is between
worldviews, not between individual or
group fairness measures
We do not deny that there are important differences between these
measures in their implementation. In particular, the lack of any
clear process for how decision-makers should determine an ap-
propriate individual similarity metric makes individual fairness a
particularly difficult measure to implement in practice. Conversely,
statistical parity is easy, and straightforward to justifywhere decision-
makers simply use differing base rates between groups as an indi-
rect proxy for the level of structural discrimination affecting them.
But despite these differences, once their starting assumptions are
clear, decision-makers will be able to find variants within both the
individual and group fairness families to choose from that reflect
those assumptions (see Table 2).
A consequence of this view is that the supposed conflict be-
tween two broad families of fairness measure is actually only a
conflict between specific variants within them, which represent
two different worldviews. The ‘raw’ similarity metric reflects the
worldview that disparities are due to personal choices. This par-
ticular variant of individual fairness conflicts with the statistical
parity variant of group fairness, which reflects the view that dis-
parities are due to unjust structures.
By selecting a different pair of variants from each family, we
can reverse the polarity. A group-adjusted variant of individual
fairness, which adjusts individuals’ features based on their group
membership (e.g. adding extra SAT points to members of a disad-
vantaged group), reflects the view that disparities are due to un-
just structures. This would conflict with the equal calibration vari-
ant of group fairness, which reflects the view that disparities in
base rates in the data are due to personal choices (or some other
morally benign cause). Individual and group fairness measures can
therefore appear on either side of the conflict depending on which
variants we select. The same conflict can of course also arise be-
tween measures within the same family. For instance, in the in-
famous example of the COMPAS criminal recidivism risk scoring
algorithm, it was illustrated that it is impossible to simultaneously
achieve two group-fairness measures; namely, false positive equal-
ity (which reflects the assumption of structural bias) and equal cal-
ibration (which reflects the assumption that disparities are benign)
[11].
5.3.1 On the legitimacy of decision-makers normative assumptions.
It is of course both empirically and politically difficult for decision-
makers to establish agreed assumptions about which factors are
the result of an individual’s free choice or (un)lucky circumstance,
and the extent to which these factors account for differences in
base rates of observed features between groups. A related and po-
tentially even more politically fraught question concerns the ex-
tent to which decision-makers in particular contexts should be
held responsible for compounding or actively correcting those in-
equalities.
Aside from these problems, the very framing of Fair-ML can also
be criticised on the grounds that it centres the decision-maker and
assumes the legitimacy of their power to make decisions based on
algorithms, including choosing which contestable assumptions to
incorporate into them [27, 40]. In many cases such legitimacy is
rightly challenged. Even if the decision-maker makes the ‘right’
assumptions about the extent of discrimination in a particular con-
text and honestly and competently factors that into their model,
we can still question whether they should have the power to wield
an ML model to make consequential decisions in the first place.
Indeed, confronted with the necessity to make normative and so-
cietal assumptions which go beyond the data, they may conclude
that the only viable option is to reject the use of an ML system
altogether.
However, if there are at least some cases in which ML systems
are legitimate, then in order to have meaningful and justifiable fair-
ness constraints at all, Fair-ML practitioners cannot avoid making
some contestable empirical and normative assumptions.
5.3.2 Relation to the (Im)Possibility of Fairness. The point above -
that it is necessary to make contestable empirical and normative
assumptions in order to pursue the aims of Fair-ML in a meaning-
ful way - is closely related to arguments put forward in previous
work by Friedler et al. [22]. The authors introduce a useful set of
distinctions between possible worldviews that could be assumed
(also using the hypothetical example of college admissions deci-
sions). Admissions tutors might decide they want to base their de-
cisions on predicted success of applicants, and posit that attributes
like self-control and ‘grit’ are determining factors of success. Such
attributes are represented in ‘construct space’ - the space of fea-
tures that the decision-maker would like to use to make a decision.
Ideally, the decision-maker would prefer to be able to map from
features in construct space directly to decision space (e.g. admit an
applicant to college or not). In practice, they must rely on an ‘ob-
served space’ containing imperfect but measurable proxies for the
features in construct space (e.g. survey-based self-control scores).
The authors propose two possibleworld-views with significantly
different consequences for howwe approach Fair-ML. On one view,
we could assume that the observed space accurately maps onto the
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construct space; in other words, ‘What You See is What You Get’
(WYSIWYG). On another view, ‘We’re All Equal’ (WAE), any dif-
ferences in distributions of features between groups we assume
are due to structural bias, which means that the distances between
individuals from different groupsmay become distorted during the
transformation between construct and observed space (a phenom-
enon they term ‘group skew’).8
These are equivalent to the contrasting assumptions introduced
in the examples above. Friedler et. al. argue that we have to make
assumptions about the extent to which each of these worldviews
are true, in order to meaningfully implement fairness constraints.
Although they do not address the relationship between different
worldviews and the individual / group fairness distinction, focus-
ing on assumed worldviews in this way can help illustrate why
apparent conflicts between individual and group fairness are mis-
guided. The important difference is betweenworldviews, notwhether
we render our assumptions about them at the individual or group
level. The reason for treating people differently on the basis of
groupmembership is the assumption that it is comparatively harder
for members of group A to get a certain score - i.e. there is group
skew when transforming between construct and observed space.
Any deviations from (or adjustments to) a task-relevant similarity
metric have therefore already been justified. Unsuccessful appli-
cants from group B cannot complain that they have been treated
unfairly because they have better ‘raw’ scores than successful ap-
plicants from group A, unless they actually intend to disagree with
the WAE assumption.
Similarly, if we assume there is no structural discrimination (WYSI-
WYG), then the observed space can be assumed to transform evenly
onto construct space. In which case, there are both group and in-
dividual measures which could be appropriate. We could choose a
similarity metric where distance in feature space is taken as an un-
problematic correspondence to task-relevant feature distance. Or
alternatively, we could choose a group fairness measure like equal
calibration, which allows for differences in outcomes between groups
in so far as the underlying base rates in labels differ. Either way, on
this view, observed space is assumed to very closely correspond to
construct space.
6 CONCLUSION
To summarise the arguments above: despite their apparent con-
flict, individual and group fairness measures do not necessarily re-
flect different normative principles. Both are commensurate with
notions of consistency and egalitarianism derived from legal and
political philosophy. Both fail to satisfy the principle of individual
justice (despite that principle’s surface-level similarities with indi-
vidual fairness).
In practice, attempts to implement individual or group fairness
would have to go through the same set of questions. These in-
clude questions about the purpose of the algorithmic system (e.g.
8Other worldviews not mentioned in [22] are also imaginable; for instance, rather
than assuming WYSIWYG or WAE, one might take the view that even though a cer-
tain group is already disproportionately likely to have positive outcomes in observed
space compared to other groups, they may actually be under-represented given their
‘real’ representation in construct space. Or it might be that once structural bias is fully
accounted for, members of usually under-represented groupsmight be evenmore qual-
ified than the general population for the task at hand (‘What You See is the Oppposite
of What You Get’).
‘what kinds of candidates do we want the system to select?’), about
the underlying assumptions regarding the data-generating process
(‘how are qualifications obtained and recorded?’), and about the
kinds of unfairness at issue (‘how have structural inequalities af-
fected the distribution of features between the relevant sub-groups?’).
The supposed conflict between individual and group fairness
measures is more an artefact of the fact that different answers to
these empirical and normative questions are typically associated
with one or the other family of measure. But there are versions of
individual and group fairness which can satisfy whatever assump-
tions we might have. This is not to imply that there are no differ-
ences between the two families ofmeasure in terms of theway they
are implemented. However, neither family can be exclusively asso-
ciated with one set of ethical, social and causal assumptions. As a
result, the normative differences within the two families of Fair-ML
measures are more important than the differences between them.
As well as helping to dissolve apparent conflicts between indi-
vidual and group fairness, thinking about the normative and em-
pirical assumptions behind particular fairness measures may lead
to other, more productive questions. For instance, if the assump-
tion behind the application of statistical parity approaches is that
the data reflect unjust structures, how might we change those un-
derlying structures (rather than papering over them by tinkering
with the model)? What could be done to intervene on the data-
generating process that would also challenge structural oppression
more directly? Finally, if the need to ‘treat people as individuals’
really is the underlying motivation for adopting individual fairness
measures, then perhaps we should reconsider whether to use ML
in such contexts at all, if it is indeed incompatible with individual
justice.
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